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Isidora Stojanovic
Institut Jean Nicod – CNRS-ENS-EHESS
isidora.stojanovic@ens.fr
Carl  Ginet  has  proposed  to  define  action  as  being  intentional  if  and  only  if  its  agent
simultaneously has a de re intention to be doing that very action. Ginet does not exactly tell us
what makes an attitude like intention de re (or, in his terms, directly referential); rather, he takes
the notion of de re attitude for granted. The gist of my paper is to show that the standard picture
of direct reference allows for cases in which the conditions in Ginet’s definition are met, yet we
would not say that the agent intended to act as she did. And the intuitive reason why the action
would not count as intentional is that the agent's intentions were not directed at her action “in the
right way.” Ironically, it  is the problem of deviant causal chains, initially targeted against the
causal theory of action, which Ginet's "acausal" theory was precisely designed to avoid, that turns
out to be a problem for Ginet's own account – only now, the deviant chain goes from the action
to the intention. 
1. The Acausal Account of Intentional Action
The aim of my paper is to explore the limits of Ginet's account of intentional action.1 I will
present a case in which an action that, intuitively, is not intentional, is predicted by his account to
1 The main reference is Carl Ginet, "Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account", Philosophical
Perspectives 3 (1989): 17-46. 
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be intentional, thus revealing a more general problem for his approach. But let me start with an
outline of the account itself. For the sake of exposition, instead of using variables for individuals
and actions, like S, X, A, I will be talking of arbitrary agents, like John, myself, and the actions of
raising hands and dancing.
Suppose that John intentionally raises his hand, in order to vote at a meeting. Ginet’s proposal
is driven by the desire to reconcile these two ideas:
a) John’s raising of his hand does not have to be determined by the previous state of affairs.
Given a complete account of John’s beliefs and desires and all the events that had occurred
up to the time of his action, it was still up to John to raise his hand rather than not raise it.
b) John’s raising of his hand was not a random happening, as an accidental muscle spasm would
have been. It was a genuine action that John did for a reason, namely, to vote. 
Ginet offers his indeterministic account of action in response to the dilemma of free will.
When John raised his hand, it  was still  in his power to do otherwise. If his action had been
determined  by  the  previous  state  of  affairs,  it  is  unclear  how  he  could  be  justifiably  held
responsible for his action. At the same time, John did what he did for a reason, in order to vote. If
John had not intended to raise his hand, e.g. if he had been forced do it, or if he did it because of
some unexpected muscle contraction, it is similarly unclear how we could hold him responsible. 
 Instead of replicating Ginet’s definitions word for word, let me adapt Ginet’s suggestion and
focus on the basic case. Intentional action may be defined as follows:
2
Def 1. I intend to raise my hand if and only if as I am raising it, I have some directly
referential intention about the raising of my hand, such as the intention that by doing it
I will express my vote. 
The notion of intention, qua a kind of attitude, will be taken for granted. My concern will bear
on the relation between the intention and the intended action. What makes an intention be about
an action? Ginet does not tell us much on what it takes for an attitude to be “directly referential.”
His position seems to be something like, “pick up your favorite view of direct reference, plug it
into my definitions, and you will get the acausal account of intentional action.” So, what views of
direct reference are there on the market? Surprisingly enough, there does not seem to be much
competition.  Marginal  questions  set  aside,  the  “best-seller”  is  the  Kripkean-Kaplanian view,
well-established in natural language semantics. I will show that when we plug the standard view
into Def. 1, the resulting account of action, although accurate most of the time, fails in certain
cases.
The concept  of direct  reference is primarily used to account  for the semantic  behavior of
directly referential expressions, whose paradigms are demonstratives “this” and “that.” The study
of such expressions goes back to Bertrand Russell, who talked of  logically proper names, via
Saul Kripke, who talked of  rigid designators, to David Kaplan, who laid down both the term
“direct reference” and a framework for the theory.2 To illustrate the idea, suppose that, bringing a
cherry to my mouth, I say “This is delicious.” I will be saying something about that very cherry,
2 Russell B., The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, La Salle, Open Court, 1985; Kripke S., Naming and Necessity,
Oxford UP, 1980;  Kaplan D., "Demonstratives", in Almog et al., Themes from Kaplan, Oxford UP 1989. 
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namely, that it is delicious. The demonstrative “this” is, on the standard view, directly referential.
It brings the reference, and nothing but the reference, to what I said.3 
The question becomes, what are directly referential intentions? First of all, how can something
that is not an expression be directly referential? We may say that an intention (and generally, an
attitude) is directly referential if and only if it can only be expressed using directly referential
expressions. In other words, an attitude is directly referential iff its content can only be specified
by means of devices like demonstratives.4 
In order to conform to a usage that I think is more common, let me stop talking of directly
referential attitudes, reserving the phrase for linguistic items, and talk of de re attitudes instead.
There will be many de re  attitudes. I say “This is delicious” because I believe  of the thing to
which I am referring, viz. the cherry, that it has the property of being delicious. I express my de
re belief about that particular cherry. And when I eat it, it is not just that I wanted to eat any given
cherry. I intended to eat that particular cherry. I had a de re intention about the cherry, to the
effect that I would eat it.
Ginet is not really interested in this kind of de re intentions, namely, intentions about things in
our environment upon which we act. He is interested in a special kind of de re intentions, those
in which the action plays the role of the ‘res.’ In our redesigned terminology, we may redefine
intentional action as follows:
3 Of course, not everyone accepts the standard view. For one, I myself have presented a number of criticisms (cf. e.g.
Stojanovic I., What Is Said: an Inquiry into Reference, Meaning and Content, Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag 2008). But
for the sake of the discussion in the present paper, problems with the standard view of direct reference may be safely
set aside.    
4 I believe that this is, roughly, what is meant by Ginet when he writes: “Given that S did V, it will suffice for the
truth of ‘S V-ed in order (thereby) to U’ if the following condition obtains: (C1) Concurrently with her action of V-
ing, S intended by that action to U (S intended of that action that by it she would U). […] Note that the content of the
intention specified in (C1) refers directly to the action it is an intention about. [...] It is owing to this direct reference
that the intention is about, and thus explanatory of, that particular action,” Ginet 1989, pp. 119-120.   
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Def 2. My action is intentional if and only if I have an accompanying de re intention about it.
The definition still  needs amendment. For one thing, some intentions, albeit de re, should
clearly not make the action intentional. Consider a person who is having an eye-twitch. She is
also desperately trying to stop it. As she is twitching, she has an accompanying de re intention
about that particular twitching, that it would stop. However, her de re intention clearly does not
turn her eye-twitching into an intentional action. So we need to refine Def. 2 in a way that blocks
this kind of cases, by requiring that the relevant de re intentions be of a suitable kind. However, I
will not pursue this point any further here.
2. When Things Are not Caused “in the Right Way”: from a Solution to a Problem
Ginet is eager to point out that the intention not only does not have to cause the action, but
cannot. For, if an attitude is to be about something, then, according to the standard understanding
of direct reference, there must be a suitable causal link from the thing to the attitude, not the
other way round. So, the action cannot at the same time cause and be caused by the intention, for
otherwise, we would have a causal loop.
Causal accounts of action, like Davidson’s,5 have difficulties with cases in which the causal
chain is not straightforward. Suppose that I want to impress John, and I believe that I would do
so by dancing rumba, and in particular, by moving my hips in a certain way. That is to say, I have
the intention to impress John by making that rumba move. Now suppose that, as John comes into
5 See e.g. Davidson D., "Actions, Reasons and Causes ", The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 685-700. 
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the ballroom, my wish to impress him becomes so intense that it triggers a muscle spasm in my
hips, which makes me move them precisely in the given way. So I move my hips and, let us
suppose, I do impress John. But was my action intentional? Was that particular move of my hips
something that I had intended? People's intuition is that it was not, in spite of the fact that my
desire to impress John caused me to move my hips the way I did. To block the claim that the
move of  my hips  was  intentional,  causal  accounts  need to  make room for the idea that  the
intention must cause the action “in the right way.” 
Ginet’s  acausal  account  clearly has  no  problem with  this  case.  A moving of  my hips  is
intentional if and only if I have an accompanying intention that by that very motion of my hips I
would, say, impress John. If I am, so to speak, taken by surprise, and I just find myself moving
my hips so, it is still open to me either to intend this action to have such-and-such effect, or not
have any intentions whatsoever about it. My having or lacking a suitable intention determines
whether I intend or not to be doing what I am doing.
Ironically, it seems that at the end of the story, Ginet’s account must also appeal to the murky
idea of things being caused “in the right way.” Only now, actions are not caused. The problem
resides  in  intentions.  I  will  present  a  case  in  which  an  agent  raises  his  hand  and  has  a
accompanying de re intention, of a suitable kind, about his action. However, the causal link from
the action to the intention that makes it a de re intention is, as it were, deviant. It cannot be too
deviant, though, because it has to secure the de-re-ness of the intention. But it is deviant enough
to pose a problem for Ginet's proposal. 
Suppose that John is a neuroscientist, and is interested in action and causation. His team is
carrying out the following experiment. Electrodes are implanted in the subjects’ brains, possibly
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unbeknownst to them, by means of which their neural events are directly manipulated, leading
them to do simple things, like move their hips or raise their hands. The subjects’ movements may
or may not be voluntary.6 At any rate, as John manipulates the neural events of the subject, he has
at his disposal the subject’s complete brain scan. He is aware of all the activities going on in the
various areas of the subject's brain, and is able to track them. His job is to cause the relevant
neurons to fire,  so as to trigger muscle contractions,  and make the subjects raise their hand.
When the subject raises his or her hand and does not form any accompanying intention about his
or her movement, the action is clearly not intentional. The subject simply raises his or her hand,
but does not intend to do so. He or she raises it because John’s electronic manipulations brought
about the neural event that is responsible for the movement at stake.
Note that John has quite a special relation to the events that are taking place in the subject’s
brain. John is related to subject’s attitudes and actions in a remarkably direct way, as he is able to
track them through the subject’s brain-scan, and not only track them, but even control them by
suitable electronic manipulations. The cognitive link between John and the subject’s attitudes
and actions has more than enough of the properties that are required for direct reference. John is
certainly aware of the subjects' action of raising their hand. For, if he were not aware of it, how
would have he been able to go on with his experiment, which precisely consists in causing and
controlling the given action? Obviously, John can have de re attitudes about the subjects' actions.
For example, he may believe of a given subject's hand-raising that it will draw the attention of his
6 In other words, as the subject is raising her hand, she may have the feeling that she is doing it voluntarily, but she
may also be unaware or her movement.  It is relevant to note this in order to distinguish the present case from the one
that Ginet considers, in which the subject is caused to perform her action by a direct manipulation of her neural
events, but she is caused to perform it voluntarily, since the “voluntary exertion,” that is, the feeling that the action is
being performed out of one's own will, is also electronically manipulated. Ginet wants to say that the action in this
other case is intentional, even though it has been caused by electronic manipulations (p. 119).   
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colleagues. John is not a mere spectator. Through electronic manipulation, he is in the position of
controlling the subjects' actions, and  he can therefore even form de re intentions about those
actions. He may intend of a given action that it would draw the attention of his colleagues.   
So far, so good. But now suppose that John himself, perhaps unbeknownst to him, happens to
be among the subjects of the experiment. Suppose that the subject on whom John is working is
John himself  (which he may ignore).  By a direct  electronic  manipulation of  his  own neural
events, John produces an appropriate firing of neurons, which triggers a muscle contraction that
results in the event of John raising his hand. John also has a de re intention about the action that
he has produced, namely, about his own hand-raising, e.g. that it would prove his experiment to
work and make him famous. The conditions for intentional action are, then, all met: as he is
raising his hand, John has a de re intention about that particular action that in virtue of it he
would  become famous.  According  to  Ginet's  proposal,  John’s  action  of  raising  his  hand  is
intentional. He raised his hand, and he intended to raise it, for he intended that that particular
action would make him famous. It thus follows, on Ginet’s account, coupled with the standard
view of direct reference, that John raised his hand in order to become famous. But this is clearly
wrong; in the case that I have presented, we would not want to say that John raised his hand in
order to become famous. Ginet's account therefore fails. 
Let me forestall some tentative objections to my argument. One might challenge the claim that
John's cognitive access to the action at stake is direct enough for him to have de re attitudes about
it. However, it is beyond doubt that John is in a position to demonstratively refer to the action.
He can say things like “Look at this! I’m sure this will be a beautiful hand-raising!” And to deny
that such occurrences of “this” are directly referential, and refer to the event of John raising his
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hand, would mean departing from our common sense about reference, and challenging certain
well-established assumptions of natural language semantics. So, if Ginet's account builds upon
the standard view of direct reference, I do not see how one could deny that John's attitude is a de
re attitude.
Now, one might point out that we constantly use demonstratives to refer to actions of other
people. Was it  necessary to imagine such a complicated case, in which John’s  access to  the
action about which he has formed a de re intention goes through the identification of the neural
events that cause the action? For comparison, consider the following case. I am in the ballroom,
which happens to have large mirrors. In one of the mirrors, I see a person who is moving her
hips. The person happens to be me, but I do not realize that. That particular action, of that person
(i.e. me) moving her hips, is something in reference to which I can use demonstratives. I can
even say things like: “Look at this! I hope that this will make everyone see how ridiculous she
is.” So, I can express a de re hope, about that particular movement of my hips, that it would make
everyone see that the person doing it is ridiculous. Don't I have, then, a de re intention, to the
effect that in virtue of that action everyone would see that the agent is ridiculous? And if I do,
then we ought to say that the moving of my hips was intentional, since by it I intended to make
everyone see how ridiculous I was. In other words, we would have to say that I moved my hips in
order to make myself ridiculous, which is intuitively wrong.7 
7As many will realize, this is an instance of the problem of the essential indexical; cf. Perry, John, "The Problem of
the Essential Indexical", Noûs 13 (1979): 3-21; reprinted in Perry, J. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and
Other Essays, Oxford UP, 1993.
9
The difference between the two cases should be clear. In latter case, where I see myself in the
mirror, it  is fair to deny the assumption that I can have a de re intention about the action of
moving my hips, which I identify as “her” action, an action of the person I see in the mirror and
fail to recognize as being myself. I can have de re attitudes about my action identified in this way,
but it is specifically de re intentions that I cannot have. To be sure, the action is mine, and in that
respect, I can in principle intend my action to have such-and-such outcomes. But in order to form
such de re intentions, I need at least to believe that the action is largely up to me. However, the
putative de re intention in the case imagined would have had to be formed without such beliefs.
And clearly, I cannot intend anything of an action over which I believe that I have neither control
nor influence. Now, the case that I presented as a problem for Ginet's account is different. There,
John is the one who is manipulating the neural events that bring about the action. In that respect,
the action is in his control, and he may legitimately intend various things of it, e.g. that it would
have such-and-such outcomes. And when John forms his de re intention about the action, he is
fully aware of the fact that he has control over the action. What he is not aware of is that the
action is his action.
In sum, while I think that Ginet's acausal account of intentional action might very well be on
the right track, it requires further work to overcome the difficulty pointed out in this paper.8
8 This is a revized draft of a paper written a couple of years ago for a seminar in Philosophy of Action, with Michael
Bratman, whom I would like to thank for helpful comments. I have chosen it as a contribution to this special issue in
analytic philosophy because I think that the problems addressed, the argumentative structure and the writing style are
all very illustrative of the analytic approach. I would also like to thank Sorin Marica for the invitation to contribute to
this issue.
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